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Building malware classificators usable by State 
security agencies
Construcción de clasificadores de malware para agencias de 
seguridad del Estado
Resumen– El sandboxing ha sido usado de manera re-
gular para analizar muestras de software y determinar 
si estas contienen propiedades o comportamientos sos-
pechosos. A pesar de que el sandboxing es una técnica 
poderosa para desarrollar análisis de malware, esta re-
quiere que un analista de malware desarrolle un análisis 
riguroso de los resultados para determinar la naturaleza 
de la muestra: goodware o malware. Este artículo pro-
pone dos modelos de aprendizaje automáticos capaces 
de clasificar muestras con base a un análisis de firmas 
o permisos extraídos por medio de Cuckoo sandbox, An-
droguard y VirusTotal. En este artículo también se pre-
senta una propuesta de arquitectura de centinela IoT 
que protege dispositivos IoT, usando uno de los modelos 
de aprendizaje automáticos desarrollados anteriormen-
te. Finalmente, diferentes enfoques y perspectivas acer-
ca del uso de sandboxing y aprendizaje automático por 
parte de agencias de seguridad del Estado también son 
aportados.
Palabras claves– Cuckoo sandbox, ciencia de datos, 
aprendizaje de máquina, análisis de malware, sandbo-
xing.
Abstract– Sandboxing has been used regularly to 
analyze software samples and determine if these contain 
suspicious properties or behaviors. Even if sandboxing 
is a powerful technique to perform malware analysis, 
it requires that a malware analyst performs a rigorous 
analysis of the results to determine the nature of the 
sample: goodware or malware. This paper proposes two 
machine learning models able to classify samples based 
on signatures and permissions obtained through Cuckoo 
sandbox, Androguard and VirusTotal. The developed mo-
dels are also tested obtaining an acceptable percentage 
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of correctly classified samples, being in this way useful 
tools for a malware analyst. A proposal of architecture 
for an IoT sentinel that uses one of the developed ma-
chine learning model is also showed. Finally, different 
approaches, perspectives, and challenges about the use 
of sandboxing and machine learning by security teams 
in State security agencies are also shared.
Keywords– Cuckoo sandbox, data science, machine 
learning, malware analysis, sandboxing.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-attacks currently are not only being ai-
med against conventional computers, but also 
against mobile devices and other devices that 
are part of the Internet of Things like smart TVs 
or smart watches. According to a study conduc-
ted by the security company Kaspersky [1], every 
second there are 250 new malicious files against 
users of computers and mobile devices in Latin 
America and during the last year, there were 1188 
million malware attacks approximately repelled by 
Kaspersky. This situation increases the work of 
malware analysts who have the task of determi-
ning behavior patterns, properties, and indicators 
that allow to identify and characterize a malware 
to prevent future infection incidents.
Malware or goodware generally comes as a PE 
(Portable Executable) file. A PE file contains all in-
formation necessary for the installation of a pro-
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gram, which includes imports or exports, compiler 
that was used (gcc, gcc+, javac, etc.), compilation 
time zone (e.g. Mon Dec 20 09:03:08 2010 com-
pilation time for WannaCry), digital certificate in-
formation, architecture for which the program was 
designed (32 bits or 64 bits), imphash (Hash ge-
nerated from exports or imports), resources that 
use the PE (e.g. The ransomware Cerber used a re-
source to ASCII Text, another to zip folder.), hashes 
(MD5 or SHA) associated with the program, deve-
loper company signature, installer size, software 
version, strings, among others. This information 
is useful to infer suspicious features or behaviors 
like operating system modules that are being in-
voked and that can allow access to the kernel, or 
some not common functions being imported. A PE 
program can have extensions: exe, dll, efi, acm, 
amongst others. On the other side, an ELF (Execu-
table and Linkable Format) program, which is the 
equivalent of PE for Linux systems, can have ex-
tensions: bin, so, elf, mod, among others. Malware 
analysis can be performed through static or dyna-
mic analysis of PE files. In static analysis, infor-
mation is obtained from the PE or ELF file using 
different reverse engineering methods such as de-
compiles, disassemblers, extract of hashes, etc. In 
dynamic analysis, the PE or ELF file is executed, 
and its behavior is obtained and analyzed such as 
changes in the registry keys (deleted, modified or 
created keys), network behavior (IPs or domains 
establishing communication) or changes in the 
file system (deleted, modified or dropped files).
One technique used by malware analyst is 
sandboxing [2]resulting in tens of billions of do-
llars in economic damages each year. Among se-
curity professionals, the skills required to quickly 
analyze and assess these attacks are in high de-
mand. Practical Malware Analysis provides a ra-
pid introduction to the tools and methods used to 
dissect malicious software (malware which allow 
determining if a software sample contains proper-
ties, through a static analysis, or behavior, through 
a dynamic analysis, that can be considered suspi-
cious. In a sandbox is possible to create controlled 
testing environments which are isolated from the 
host operating system, each one of them having 
its own disk space and memory. A testing environ-
ment must not access any resource that has not 
been specifically assigned to it. Virtual machines 
are the mechanism to deploy controlled testing 
environments with a different operative system 
over which is possible to test suspicious programs 
and resources without compromising the host.
An example of malware analysis using sandbo-
xing can be seen with WannaCry. WannaCry was a 
ransomware, which affected many Windows com-
puters and servers last year through the exploita-
tion of an SMB 1 vulnerability, which is a protocol 
responsible for the communication of Windows 
computers on a network [3]. WannaCry encrypts 
information stored in a victim pc and requests 
a payment that oscillates between 200 to 600 
bitcoins to get back access to the files. Through 
a sandbox and specifically a static analysis of a 
sample of WannaCry is possible to find that it uses 
a suspicious function called CryptDestroyKey. The 
CryptDestroyKey function is used to destroys the 
key hindering the decryption process. 
Another information that could be obtained 
from WannaCry is the Callback TLS (Thread Local 
Storage), which are pieces of code that are execu-
ted before the Entrypoint, i.e. the sample starting 
execution point, and that many times are not re-
viewed by a debug system making them exploita-
ble by malware developers which inject malicious 
source code into those spaces. Fig. 1 shows the 
information obtained from a static analysis for a 
Wannacry sample run in a sandbox, which inclu-
des Imphash, sha, compiler, compilation time, 
among other details.
Fig. 1. STATIC ANALYSIS OF WANNACRY WITH A SANDBOX
Source: The authors.
There are some notable researches that inte-
grate sandboxing with machine learning seeking 
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to potentiate security solutions through interdis-
ciplinarity. One related work is presented in [5] 
which proposes the use of machine learning clas-
sification methods for malware detection using 
sandbox, behavioral analysis and injection of 
instrumentation code. Also, [6]however, it\\ncon-
sistently fails to detect new malware. Supervised 
machine learning\\nhas been adopted to solve 
this issue. There are two types of features\\nthat 
supervised malware detectors use: (i proposes the 
use of supervised machine learning methods to 
detect malware through the identification of static 
(extracted without running the sample) and dyna-
mic (require an execution) characteristics. Similar-
ly, [7]custom code bases and in-memory execution. 
Our hypothesis is that we can produce a high de-
gree of accuracy in distinguishing malicious from 
trusted samples using Machine Learning with fea-
tures derived from the inescapable footprint left 
behind on a computer system during execution. 
This includes CPU, RAM, Swap use and network 
traffic at a count level of bytes and packets. These 
features are continuous and allow us to be more 
flexible with the classification of samples than dis-
crete features such as API calls (which can also be 
obfuscated proposes the use of machine activity 
metrics to automatically identify trustworthy and 
reliable portable executable (PE) samples, throu-
gh classification methods that use self-organized 
feature maps creating unsupervised clusters of 
similar behavior. On the other hand, Donaldson 
SE et al. [8] exposes some next-generation cyber-
security axioms and sub-axioms for cybersecurity 
teams and state agencies which can help them to 
be more effective against attackers. These axioms 
states that i) Companies must look at themselves 
from the perspective of the attacker and design de-
fenses accordingly, ii) Defenses must be designed 
to detect and delay attacks, so that defenders have 
time to respond, iii) Layers of defense are required 
to contain attacks and redundancy in protection 
and iv) Use of active defense to trap and repel at-
tacks after they start, but before they can succeed.
On the other hand, regarding security propo-
sals for IoT ecosystems, an architecture for an IoT 
sentinel that protects IoT devices is presented in 
[4]. This IoT sentinel is capable of identify devices 
and its types from the network it is connected. The 
sentinel also reduces potential damage of vulnera-
ble devices by constraining their communications 
through specific network rules. The identification 
of the devices is done using their network traffic 
fingerprint, which is used for anomaly detection 
using a machine learning model to detect unusual 
behavior on the network.
The paper at hand is composed as follows. 
Section 2 presents malware analysis using the 
Cuckoo sandbox and introduce data science. 
Then, Section 3 proposes a mechanism to apply 
data science as support for malware classification 
and develops two machine learning models that 
classify malware for desktop and mobile operative 
systems. Later, Section 3 proposes an architectu-
re for securing IoT ecosystems using a set of rings 
one of them based on one of the developed ma-
chine learning models. Next, Section 4 makes a 
reflection regarding the use of sandbox and ma-
chine learning by state security agencies. Finally, 
some conclusions and future works are included.
2. CUCKOO SANDBOXING AND DATA SCIENCE
Sandboxing allows performing static and dyna-
mic analysis of samples, enabling a deeper unders-
tanding of malware and its variants. This section 
presents Cuckoo sandbox as a solution to perform 
malware analysis and introduce data science. 
2. 1 Cuckoo sandboxing
Cuckoo was born during the Google’s Summer 
of Code of 2010 as part of The Honeynet Project. 
Claudio Guarnieri is the founder of the project who 
performs as a researcher in the fields of computer 
security. Claudio Guarnieri has researched botnets 
and directed attacks. He has also been a speaker 
at Hack In The Box, Black Hat, and Chaos Com-
munication Congress. Cuckoo is an open source 
sandbox, which has an active community in char-
ge of its development and a repository which allow 
accessing its source code. Cuckoo allows multiple 
input formats however in the research developed 
in this paper will be a focus in samples of the type 
PE and ELF[9].
Fig. 2 shows the topology of Cuckoo sandbo-
xing. The cuckoo server hosts a virtualization en-
vironment through tools such as VMWare or Vir-
tualBox and at least one virtual machine. Virtual 
machines are snapshots of an operative system 
with an agent.py file installed. The agent.py file is 
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the way by which the Cuckoo server communicates 
with each of the virtual machines to send samples 
to be analyzed. Cuckoo server and the virtual ma-
chines must compose a Host-Only Network, i.e. a 
private network that only allows the connection of 
a cuckoo server with each of the virtual machines.
To develop malware analysis Cuckoo has se-
veral tools or plugins, like Volatility1 [10] and Tcp-
dump [11]. Volatility is used to perform forensic 
analysis of the memory ram of virtual machines, 
on the other side Tcpdump is a sniffer that allows 
monitoring the traffic of the virtual machine.
Fig. 2. CUCKOO SANDBOX TOPOLOGY
Source: The authors.
Static and dynamic analysis can be carried 
out by Cuckoo. As a result of static and dynamic 
analyzes a series of malware analysis reports are 
generated, which are used to generate signatu-
res that represent characteristics or patterns of a 
sample. Cuckoo includes a pool of signatures by 
default and allow to incorporate new ones becau-
se is an open source project [12].
Fig. 3 shows a Cuckoo signature which contains 
a description and an associated severity: low (1), 
normal (2) and high (3). This signature reports the 
creation of a window executable on some location 
of the filesystem, and in the same way, signatures 
can report another suspicious behavior like the 
shutdown of an operative system firewall service 
or the modification of critical operative system fi-
les. Cuckoo identifies which of the signatures are 
present in a sample and include them as matched 
signatures in the report.
Cuckoo Sandbox offers the following sections 
accessible after a malware analysis is done (Fig. 4):
• Summary: It includes the most relevant featu-
res of the analyzed malware, like hashes, size, 
imphashes, file type, among others.
1 https://www.volatilityfoundation.org/ 
• Static Analysis: It contains sections (e.g. .data, 
.text, etc.), strings, file size, compilation time, 
amongst others elements, obtained from a de-
compilation and static analysis of the sample.
• Extracted Artifacts: It indicates what files were 
extracted successfully from the sample.
• Behavioral Analysis: It contains details of the file 
system, registry keys, process tree, and process 
content, amongst others elements, obtained 
when the sample is executed in a virtual machine.
• Network Analysis: It contains communications 
managed by the sample through protocols 
such as DNS, HTTP, UDP, ICMP etc.
• Dropped Files: It shows the files that were crea-
ted or downloaded by the sample.
• VM Memory Dump: It contains the result of the 
virtual machine memory dump when the sam-
ple is being executed, making possible to ob-
tain some useful information from the sample 
like the registry keys values.
• Reboot Analysis: Analysis of the status of the 
virtual machine where the sample was execu-
ted after a restart of the virtual machine.
• Dropped Buffers: It shows the buffers that 
were created when the sample was executed.
• Process Memory: It contains information about 
the processes created in the volatile memory 
by the sample.
• Compare Analysis: Information provided by Cuc-
koo when two sample analysis are compared.
• Export Analysis: It offers the option of expor-
ting the sample report to JSON (JavaScript Ob-
ject Notation) format.
Fig. 5 describe the general steps of a malware 
analysis using Cuckoo Sandbox. First, a sample is 
submitted to Cuckoo sandbox selecting, between 
all available Cuckoo virtual machines, the one over 
which the sample must be executed according to 
the sample extension type. Second, Cuckoo receives 
the sample and performs different analyzes (static 
and dynamic) from the application of reversing te-
chniques and the installation and the execution of 
the sample in the selected virtual machine. Finally, 
Cuckoo generates reports which help the analyst to 
determine if the sample is goodware or malware.
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Fig. 3. CUCKOO SIGNATURE
Source: http://jamu.info/pwnypot/docs/customization/signatures.html
Fig. 4. SECTIONS DISPLAYED BY CUCKOO
Source: The authors.
Fig. 5. MALWARE ANALYSIS IN CUCKOO SANDBOX
Source: The authors.
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Cuckoo also allows analyzing URLs to identify 
suspicious network behavior i.e. if after acces-
sing an URL some malicious file is downloaded or 
some strange activity is evidenced. Fig. 6 shows a 
fragment of a report generated by Cuckoo which 
includes the score of how suspicious is a Wanna-
Cry URL. Fig. 7 shows all communications toward 
different domains identified by Cuckoo for the URL 
mentioned in Fig 6. URL analysis allows to verify 
communications with domains considered as ma-
licious, or consumption of resources from domains 
that are considered clean now of access but that 
resolves toward an IP that in the past was invol-
ved with the malicious activity. A domain name 
that changes IPs frequently or an IP that modify 
domain names recurrently are suspicious findings 
that can be obtained from an URL analysis. This in-
formation must be reviewed by a malware analyst 
to classify a sample as goodware or malware.
2. 2 Data science
Last years the amount of available data has 
increased markedly, so traditional analytic, based 
mainly in statistics, modelers and manual analy-
sis, has been overpassed by the volume and di-
versity of the data to analyze [13] Also, it is fun-
damental to not only extract information from that 
data, it has to describe more than the training set, 
it has to generalize those attributes to the possible 
data the model will receive [14].
In general, data science is the discipline of 
using quantitative methods from traditional analy-
sis fields, like statistics and mathematics and 
combine them with modern concepts to create 
algorithms that analyze the data to discover pat-
terns that allow to generalize over all the possible 
data, and to make predictions that solve different 
kind of problems [15].
An important key component in data science 
projects is the development of a data science model 
which can works with an enough efficiency. The se-
lection and tuning of a data science model is a task 
that requires some knowledge about the application 
of machine learning models and its mathematical 
fundamentals, so they can be adjust properly.
Fig. 6. WANNACRY URL ANALYSIS
Source: The authors.
Fig. 7. URL NETWORK ANALYSIS BY CUCKOO
Source: The authors.
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A wide understanding of the problem to be sol-
ved is also an important aspect that the members 
of a data science project must consider, as it helps 
in different phases of a data science life cycle like 
the business understanding, the data filtering and 
interpretation and the model evaluation and de-
ployment [16]. The problems, predictions or ques-
tions that data science can answer are:
• Is it A or B? (Classification or categorization)
• Is this strange? (Detection of anomalies) [17]
• How much or how many? (Prediction of values)
• How is it organized? (Description of items)
• What should I do? (Prescription) [18]
To develop data science projects, a set of avai-
lable data regarding the problem to solve must be 
available. These data must fit at least the following 
criteria, which allow to validate the applicability of 
a data set to solve a problem:
• Volume: The available data must have a consi-
derable size, due generally as much as data is 
included better result can be obtained.
• Relevant: Data should be relevant to the con-
text of the question to be solved.
• Precise: The available data must be correct, 
so they can represent closely the reality of the 
problem.
• Not connected: Available data should also be 
not-linked but related, so the values of the fea-
tures have not dependable relations that gene-
rate mistakes in the data science model [19].
Machine learning is the way knowledge is extrac-
ted, ordered and classified from apparently uncon-
nected data, this knowledge is useful to do predic-
tions and take decisions, with this definition and the 
definition of data science it is possible to say that 
machine learning is a discipline of data science [20]. 
The machine learning models can be genera-
ted from data using Weka [21], which contains a 
collection of machine learning algorithms for data 
mining. As shown in Fig. 8, a classificatory algo-
rithm can be trained using an available data set 
that has been classified previously. Once a model 
is trained, unclassified data can be entered to the 
model, so it can make a classification for each one 
of them.
Fig. 8. DEVELOPMENT OF A CLASSIFICATORY MACHINE LEARNING 
MODEL
Source: The authors
3. MACHINE LEARNING MODELS APPLIED TO 
MALWARE ANALYSIS
Even if sandboxing is a powerful technique 
to perform malware analysis, it requires that a 
malware analyst performs a rigorous analysis of 
the results to determine the nature of the sample: 
goodware or malware. 
In a sandbox, we can observe the behavior of 
a malware that is trying to access, destroy, copy, 
or alter information with a motivation that can be 
economical or political. Those characteristics are 
obtained by analyzing PE or EFL for desktop appli-
cations o APKs for mobile applications. The results 
of the analyzes provided by a sandbox must be in-
terpreted by an expert to determine if it is a malwa-
re or not. This analysis generally consumes time 
and the quality of the result depends on the exper-
tise of the malware analyst. So, this paper proposes 
a mechanism that aims to resolve the data science 
question of classifying unknown samples between 
two possible options (Goodware or Malware) hel-
ping in this way to the malware analyst and redu-
cing the time that is required for an analysis.
The mechanisms proposed in this paper are 
based on the development of machine learning 
models that can classify windows desktop and 
mobile android applications. An integration of 
Cuckoo with machine learning is proposed, so the 
results of Cuckoo are taken, and a machine lear-
ning model is trained with them, so it can be used 
to make classification of unknown samples. Fig. 
9 shows the process of training of machine lear-
ning models using samples with that APK (Android 
Application Package) and EXE extensions (PE fi-
les). The process of training of machine learning 
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models follow the steps: Collection of samples, 
classification of samples using VirusTotal, analysis 
of samples using Cuckoo sandbox or Androguard, 
extraction of sample features from Cuckoo or An-
droguard, generation of a training data set and 
training of a machine learning model. These steps 
will be applied in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Fig. 9. TRAINING OF MACHINE LEARNING MODELS FROM SAMPLES
Source: The authors.
3. 1 Analyzing PE files
The development of a machine learning model 
that allows classifying a sample between malware 
and goodware, required to download 108 samples 
from The Zoo2 and from various official download 
pages, then such samples were classified using the 
API (Application Programming Interface) of Virus 
Total (as malware and goodware). In the next step, 
each of the files was uploaded to Cuckoo sandbox 
to perform a malware analysis. The results of the-
se analyzes contain the signatures with which the 
sample matches. Cuckoo has a collection of signa-
tures, which are updated or created daily by contri-
butors around the world since Cuckoo sandbox is 
2 https://github.com/ytisf/theZoo.
an open source project. The signatures allow us to 
identify patterns associated with previously known 
malware behaviors, e.g. a try of access to kernel 
commands or the holding of fake certificates. This 
analysis allow us to obtain a context of the sam-
ple and facilitates the interpretation of the results. 
Cuckoo sandbox has signatures that allow you to 
identify a family or categories of malware (spyware, 
worms, etc.) and identify modifications or installa-
tions that specific malware perform to gain control 
of a target. Currently, signatures are also used by 
some antivirus to detect malware [36]. 
Each report generated by Cuckoo was exported 
and signatures were extracted from them, which 
became the basis for the construction of the ma-
chine learning model.
Fig. 10 shows some of the signatures found in 
a report indicating that the virtual machine firewa-
ll service was stopped, some URLS related to com-
mand and control servers were requested and pro-
cesses were injected, amongst others suspicious 
findings that indicate that the sample presents 
a malicious behavior. To automatize the genera-
tion of reports from Cuckoo sandboxing, a python 
script (Parser.py) was created which extracts the 
Cuckoo signatures from reports and parse them 
to train the machine learning model. 
A training data set was built from the obtained 
Cuckoo signatures of each sample for a total of 
58 signatures or features. Each row in the training 
data set is a sample that has a set of signatures 
(marked as ones), that indicate that the sample 
matched that signature. On the other hand, the 
last column refers to the sample classification 
(Goodware or Malware) was obtained from the API 
of Virus Total. A representation of the training data 
set can be seen in table I. All the malware samples 
evaluated were taken from The Zoo.
TABLE I
STRUCTURE OF THE TRAINING DATA SET FOR DESKTOP APPLICATIONS
Signature 1 Signature 2 … Signature 58 Class
Sample 1 1 0 … 1 GOO
Sample 2 0 0 … 1 MAL
... … … … … …
Sample 108 1 1 … 0 MAL
Source: The authors.
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The developed machine learning model has 
an accurateness of 88.8889% using the Random 
SubSpace method [22] using a 20-fold cross-vali-
dation. This model obtained the results shown in 
table II.
TABLE II
EVALUATION VALUES FOR RANDOM SUBSPACE MODEL
Kappa statistic 0.7295
Mean absolute error 0.2697
Root mean squared error 0.3338
Kappa statistic is a statistic measure that help 
to evaluate how much two classifiers agree in the 
classification of samples. When classifiers agree 
all the times, Kappa value is 1. 
On the other side, when the classifiers only 
agree by chance, Kappa is 0 [23]. The Kappa sta-
tistic of the developed model is 0.7295, so it is 
not as good as expect, but it is high enough to be 
considered a substantial agreement without chan-
ce. The Mean absolute error (MAE) and the Root 
mean squared error are measures to describe the 
error in the average operation of the machine lear-
ning model [24].
The MAE indicate the deviation between the 
classification got from the model versus the ac-
tual sample classification. In Fig. 11. an example 
of prediction using this machine learning model is 
shown, where a sample is classified as goodware 
with an error of 0.728.
3. 2 Analyzing Android mobile applications
Despite all advantages and functionalities 
that Cuckoo provides in the analysis of malware 
for desktop operating systems, it has many res-
trictions and problems in the analysis of malware 
for mobile applications. Some of the problems 
are the reduced compatibility with Android SDK 
(Software Development Kit) and the restriction of 
just to allow one hypervisor running at the same 
time on the same machine, i.e. an android emu-
lator could not run over a virtualbox instance. 
On the other hand, Android emulation re-
quire high computational requirements, not 
to mention the incompatibility of processor ar-
chitectures due to most of mobile devices are 
made with ARM architecture, while the sandbox 
and Cuckoo were implemented on Intel architec-
ture. With these previously mentioned constra-
ints, an analysis over an Android emulator could 
last up to three hours. To solve these problems, 
Androguard was used, which is a tool written in 
Python that have multiple functions to analyze 
Android files. Androguard client is simple to use 
and allows the automation of processes using 
classes included by default. Androguard allows 
to extract permissions requested by Android 
applications and use them as features to com-
pose a training data set that can be used later in 
the machine learning generation process.
Fig. 10. CUCKOO SIGNATURES
Source: The authors.
Fig. 11. PREDICTION FOR A DESKTOP MALWARE USING WEKA
Source: The authors.
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A machine learning model was developed with 
123 APK (Android Application Package) samples, 
which were classified as Goodware or Malware 
according to the results obtained from VirusTotal 
API. VirusTotal reports were used also to extract 
the Android permits of each APK sample. A trai-
ning data set was built from the permits of each 
sample, having one feature for each permit, for a 
total of 256 signatures/features. Each sample is 
an element of the training set having a set of sig-
natures/features that indicate if the sample mat-
ched with that permit.
Each permit has at least one application using 
it. The structure of the training data set for the mo-
del can be seen in table III. T generate the model, 
a python script was developed that takes VirusTo-
tal reports, extract the identified permits and ge-
nerates a training data set in a format (.arff) that 
can be accepted by Weka.
The trained machine learning model has an 
accurateness of 93.4959% using a neuronal ne-
twork “Multilayer Perceptron” and a cross-valida-
tion of 10 blocks. This model obtained the results 
shown in table IV.
The Kappa coefficient of the model is 0.8105, 
it means that two classifiers are in a substantial 
agreement regarding if a sample is considered 
as goodware or malware. Following the analysis 
of these measures, the mean absolute error is 
quite low, and the mean square error is higher, 
meaning that the model has an acceptable ac-
curateness.
Once the model has been trained, this can 
be used to make predictions about unknown 
Android samples. Testing of the model can be 
done using samples that are different from the 
ones used to compose the training data set. The-
se samples can are analyzed by Androguard to 
obtain the permits and then parsed to compose 
a testing data set in a format that is accept by 
Weka. Once the testing set is parsed, it can be 
entered to the trained model in Weka and a pre-
diction for each sample is generated which can 
support the analyst in the process of identifying 
unknown sample as malware. An example of pre-
diction using Weka can be seen in Fig. 12, where 
an unknown sample is classified as malware with 
a 100% of probability.
3. 3 Use case: IoT t3
This section presents a proposal of architec-
ture for malware detection in IoT ecosystems 
using the machine learning model developed in 
3.2. The model can be incorporated to a security 
component called sentinel which automate the 
classification of samples that are downloaded by 
IoT devices, so it can be possible to protect a ne-
twork of IoT (Internet of Things) devices[37]. The 
sentinel architecture has several security rings 
that protect IoT devices with a defense in-depth 
strategy [25]. If one sample pass as goodware by 
the first ring, it will be evaluated by the second 
ring and then by a third ring. Sentinel architectu-
TABLE III
STRUCTURE OF THE TRAINING DATA SET FOR ANDROID APPLICATIONS
Permit 1 Permit 2 … Permit 256 Class
Sample 1 1 0 … 1 MAL
Sample 2 0 0 … 1 MAL
… … … … … …
Sample n 1 1 ... 0 GOO
Source: The authors.
TABLE IV
EVALUATION VALUES FOR NEURAL NETWORK MODEL
Kappa statistic 0.8105
Mean absolute error 0.0679
Root mean squared error 0.2274
Source: The authors.
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re can be seen in Fig. 13 with each ring having 
the following functions:
1. IDS (Intrusion Detection System) [26]: This ring 
detects intrusions in the network, whether by 
ethernet or wifi. It also analyzes the network 
searching for vulnerable IoT devices. All infor-
mation collected by this ring is sent to an event 
correlation server.
2. Internal Analyzer Yara Rules [27]: These rules 
allow to define features to look in samples, so 
through static reversing engineering can be 
possible to detect malware samples. 
3. Machine Learning model: In this ring, the sample 
is analyzed by the machine learning model deve-
loped in section 3.2. The machine learning mo-
del offered by this ring can be consulted through 
an API REST. Through this API the sample permits 
are gotten and passed to the trained model, so it 
can classify the unknown sample.
4. External analyzer: If none of the previous rings 
have detected the sample as malware, then it 
is forwarded to an external analyzer (e.g. Virus-
Total) so it can be analyzed, and a classifica-
tion report can be obtained.
Fig. 13. IOT SENTINEL ARCHITECTURE
Source: The authors.
4. USING SANDBOXING AND MACHINE LEAR-
NING IN STATE SECURITY AGENCIES
The defense of malicious attacks is one of the 
biggest challenges for organizations and cyberse-
curity teams nowadays. In this regard, Symantec 
in its Internet Security Threat Report 2018 [28] 
mentions that threats to digital security can come 
from unexpected sources and that with each pas-
sing year will increase the volume and diversity of 
threats, with attackers working hard to discover 
new forms of attack and concealment. Likewi-
se, this report highlights the following key points 
around existence of malware [29]:
• Coin mining was the largest area of growth in 
cybercrime in 2017, with antivirus detections 
of up to 8,500% compared to 2016.
• For 2017, ransomware infections increased 
40% with respect to 2016, driven mainly by 
WannaCry (Ransom.Wannacry).
• The number of ransomware variants for 2017 
increased 46% with respect to 2016, even 
though fewer new families emerge, indicating 
an activity intensified by established groups, 
i.e. existing families increments its number of 
ransomware variants.
• Emotet (Trojan.Emotet) reappeared at the end 
of 2017 as a major threat for banking sector 
and Emotet detections increased by 2,000% in 
the last quarter.
• E-mail filtering, intrusion prevention system 
(IPS) and machine learning have supported 
the early detection in the ransomware chain of 
infection. In this regard, 2017 presented an in-
crease of 92% compared to 2016, in blocking 
of scripts and macro downloaders, which are 
one of the largest sources of ransomware and 
banking threats.
• The general variants of malware have increa-
sed by 88%; mainly composed by a single type 
Fig. 12. PREDICTION FOR AN ANDROID MALWARE USING WEKA
Source: The authors.
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of threat, the Trojan.Kotver! gm2, that repre-
sents 95% of the total data.
As mentioned by Yokoyama A. et al [30], the-
se growing trends in the amount and variety of 
malware are consequence of polymorphism, i.e. 
malware that uses a polymorphic engine to mu-
tate itself while keeping its original algorithm in-
tact [31]. This technique is commonly used by 
computer viruses and worms to hide its presen-
ce. Malware growing trends are also impacted by 
new threats discovered almost daily. In this sense, 
cybersecurity teams use technologies and techni-
ques that facilitate malware analysis and help to 
prevent attacks on critical assets, such as sand-
boxing [30].
Sandboxing is a technique that allows to enfor-
ce security policies for untrustworthy applications 
in a secure environment to reduce risks for the 
host system. It is appropriate to mitigate threats 
that traditional security systems are unable to pre-
vent [32]. Due to new threats imply a more detai-
led and holistic analysis of its multiple features, 
sandboxing can be enhanced by other techniques 
such as machine learning, which seeks [33] to 
resolve problems in an automated way using ex-
perience and empirical data. Two sandbox approa-
ches are traditionally managed: rule and isolation 
based, each one has advantages and limitations. 
In an isolation based approach an application A 
executes an application B in a sandboxed environ-
ment, usually virtualized, where application B has 
access to some specific and controlled sandbox 
resources [34]with each process typically capable 
of utilising all of the user’s privileges. Consequent-
ly such security mechanisms often fail to protect 
against contemporary threats, such as previously 
unknown (‘zero-day’. On the other hand, in a ruled 
based approach each sandbox enforces a specific 
policy regarding the resources that applications 
within the sandbox can access. Application A can 
launch application B implicitly in sandbox B which 
enforce a policy for B [34]with each process typi-
cally capable of utilising all of the user’s privileges. 
Consequently such security mechanisms often fail 
to protect against contemporary threats, such as 
previously unknown (‘zero-day’.
Among the most prominent variations of san-
dbox approaches is the one presented by Potter 
and Nieh, mentioned by Schreuders ZC et al. [34]
with each process typically capable of utilising 
all of the user’s privileges. Consequently such 
security mechanisms often fail to protect against 
contemporary threats, such as previously unk-
nown (‘zero-day’, who propose a container based 
sandbox for application-oriented access control. 
This proposal is known as Apiary and works in a 
similar way to the security operating system Qu-
bes, which was developed by Rutkowska and Wo-
jtczuk, and aims to provides isolation through a 
virtualization interface for security purposes [34]
with each process typically capable of utilising all 
of the user’s privileges. Consequently such secu-
rity mechanisms often fail to protect against con-
temporary threats, such as previously unknown 
(‘zero-day’. Another solution that applies sandbo-
xing principles is Cuckoo SandBox, which is an 
open source software for automated analysis of 
suspicious files that monitor the behavior of ma-
licious processes under an isolated environment.
Similarly, Schreuders ZC et al. [34]with each 
process typically capable of utilising all of the 
user’s privileges. Consequently such security 
mechanisms often fail to protect against con-
temporary threats, such as previously unknown 
(‘zero-day’ mention that some sandbox schemes 
allow applications to read data from the host 
computer with some restrictions like copy-on-wri-
te functions, which are resource management 
techniques used in programming to implement 
efficiently a “duplicate” or “copy” operation [35]. 
Copy-on-write functions allow to write any modi-
fication made by the application in a virtual disk 
instead of the real hard disk. Solutions like Sand-
boxie3, and Shade Sandbox4 follow the approach 
mentioned previously. Other sandbox solutions 
run stand-alone applications through a Virtual 
Machine Manager (VMM) or an interpreter, thus, 
avoiding applications of making changes to the 
host computer without user intervention. Java, 
Silverlight and Flash Applets use the approach 
here mentioned to insert mobile code content 
into websites with a very limited access to stora-
ge and additional accesses granted through user 
interaction [34]with each process typically capa-
ble of utilising all of the user’s privileges. Conse-
quently such security mechanisms often fail to 
3 https://www.sandboxie.com/
4 https://www.shadesandbox.com/
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protect against contemporary threats, such as 
previously unknown (‘zero-day’.
Sandboxing integrated with machine learning 
constitute a defense that fits with more of the-
se axioms because it is designed thinking in the 
attacker capabilities to build sneaky software 
that contains malicious functions. Additionally, 
it allows to examine malicious malware before it 
reaches critical assets, offering a detection and 
delay of the attack. It also constitutes an addi-
tional security layer that allows to avoid that an 
attack succeeds. This is due to sandboxing is de-
signed with the purpose that a malware does not 
affect the area outside an isolated environment, 
even if the malware defeats all the defenses 
arranged in the sandbox. Through sandboxing 
it can be possible to detect and delay attacks 
by running suspicious samples in a test environ-
ment which can be empowered with machine 
learning to offer an additional layer of defense 
against unknown threats or mutations of some 
already extended malware. This would allow se-
curity teams to have time to respond to attacks, 
supplying the shortcomings of other security la-
yers like antivirus. Now, in relation to national 
initiatives related to the use of sandboxing and 
machine learning by cybersecurity teams and 
state security agencies, the Government of 
Colombia has been developing some projects 
applied to its cybernetic defense processes, but 
these are isolated and used alternately and not 
combined. That is why, the developments pre-
sented in this paper are a novel proposal in this 
regard which integrates sandboxing and machi-
ne learning, supporting in the way cybersecurity 
teams such as the Cybernetic Joint Command 
(CCOC). Specifically, machine learning models 
proposed in Section 3.1 and 3.2, and architec-
ture described in Section 3.3, are evidence of 
how machine learning and sandboxing can work 
together to automates the classification process 
of unknown samples.
Regarding the CCOC [36], who is responsible 
for the nation cyberdefense, some research and 
development (R&D) initiatives have been imple-
mented, with support of the Colombian School 
of Engineering Julio Garavito, to include machi-
ne learning techniques in cybersecurity process. 
One example is the project “Implementation of 
a Security Information and Event Management 
System for information asset protection” which 
integrates machine learning models in event co-
rrelation engines, so it can be possible to predict 
cybersecurity incidents related with critical cyber-
netic infrastructure. Another example is the pro-
ject “Open Source Intelligence applied to the Co-
lombian context” which develops some machine 
learning models to make sentiment analysis of 
information collected from social networks. The-
se two initiatives optimize labors of CCOC agents 
working on SOC (Security Operation Center) and 
intelligence groups. A governmental initiative re-
lated with sandboxing is the “Malware Analysis 
Service” offered by the Colombian National Po-
lice [37] through the CSIRT division. This service 
allows to perform file or URL analysis, identifying 
suspicious features that are common in malwa-
re. It is implemented over Cuckoo Sandbox and 
outputs a summarized malware analysis that 
help Colombian citizens to determine if a file or 
URL is malicious. 
As described previously, cybersecurity teams 
and governments must face the challenges of 
new threats through techniques that allow the 
software to be examined holistically and pro-
vide an advanced level of analysis, beyond the 
techniques that traditionally have led the batt-
le against malware. That is why initiatives such 
as those presented in this paper, which combi-
ne malware analysis techniques such as sand-
box with advanced analysis techniques such as 
machine learning, are highly relevant and allow 
a proactive reaction to cyberattacks. At last, it 
must be remembered that sandbox solutions are 
susceptible to anti sandbox techniques, e.g. use 
of virtualization detection techniques, detection 
of presence of real users (Turing test), detection 
of hooking, exploitation of sandbox limitations 
or use of advanced Anti-VM and Anti-Sandbox 
tools. This poses a new challenge related to how 
protection against sandbox evasion techniques 
must be conducted, and in the same way it is a 
warning for sandbox operators regarding threats 
that in fact may already be executed silently with 
such techniques [30]. Finally, there are many 
advantages of using sandbox and machine lear-
ning, even if it also presents some challenges in 
for its application by cybersecurity teams of state 
security agencies. Specifically, for the Colombian 
State, the identified challenges are:
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• Update of machine learning models to be 
re-trained with recent malware samples.
• Counter techniques and tools for Anti-VM and 
Anti-Sandbox.
• Implement the sharing of malware information 
with national and international security agen-
cies that allow to strength the cyber-defense 
processes.
• Deal with the existence of malware samples 
that are found only in Colombia.
• Build more complete machine learning models 
that include more malware features, in addi-
tion to signatures and permits.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Sandbox techniques are useful to make 
malware analysis however they can be automated 
and supported by machine learning models, so a 
malware analyst can perform malware identifica-
tion tasks with more precision and in less time. 
Additionally, regarding analysis of mobile malware 
threats with sandbox, it is needed that the sand-
box solution has integration with mobile devices 
operative systems. To develop machine learning 
models, it is mandatory to validate the data quali-
ty in terms of the criterions mentioned in section 
2.2 (Volume, Relevant, Precise, Not connected). 
The two models developed in this paper use sig-
natures and permits as features of samples which 
were considered as relevant in a malware detec-
tion problem. The precision of the data depends 
on the ability to extract these features from the 
samples using Cuckoo, Androguard or Virus To-
tal. As future work we will increase the number of 
samples to increase the volume of data.
The machine learning models developed in 
this paper can classify a sample as Goodware 
and Malware, however with a bigger dataset it 
could be possible to classify samples in more than 
two classes. A more fine-grained classification of 
samples could allow to identify different malware 
categories and would be useful to determine spe-
cific countermeasures for each class. Finally, the 
approaches and perspectives presented in sec-
tion 3 regarding the use of machine learning mo-
dels can support the development of new IoT se-
curity devices that offer a strong security schema 
against new malware that has not been previously 
classified by regular security mechanism.
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